Post

Contagious Interview Campaign

A fake developer interview, a GitHub release archive with a Git clean filter, and a Node.js loader that looked up its C2 on Polygon.

Contagious Interview Campaign

Contagious Interview is a malware campaign that targets software developers through fake job interviews. A recruiter gets a candidate on a call and gives them a project to review or run before the next round. The take-home assignment gives the recruiter a reason to send code and the candidate a reason to open it.

While researching Contagious Interview, I came across Axonion Trading Demo. It was presented as a take-home assignment after a LinkedIn conversation and a Google Meet call. The project looked like a plausible decentralized exchange demo, with a TypeScript matching engine and Playwright tests. In the ZIP attached to the GitHub release, I found a Git configuration that could start a downloader during a routine status check.

What was in the release ZIP

Inside the release ZIP, the bundled .git directory contained a clean filter named ltr. Git can invoke a clean filter while checking the working tree, so a routine git status can be enough to launch it. An IDE that checks Git status can hit the same path before anyone installs a dependency.

Axonion Trading Demo on GitHub beside the Git configuration from the release ZIP The Axonion release listing and the clean filter in the archive’s Git configuration.

The filter script fetched a downloader hosted on Vercel. The samples I reviewed included a bundled Node.js runtime under ~/.cache/rt/ and loaders at ~/.vs_cache/main.js and ~/.cache/rt/d.js.

Where the loader got its C2

The command-and-control (C2) URL in d.js came from Polygon. The loader queried a smart contract using eth_call to get the current address. The loader then requested a session over HTTP and ran the JavaScript it received. It also had a fallback host, kkhf7a[.]s[.]gy, for when the on-chain lookup failed.

Redacted screenshot of the Node.js loader beside a summary of its Polygon C2 lookup The loader is redacted on the left. The right panel summarizes the C2 lookup.

The samples I reviewed also included files labeled Ottercookie, NetSupport RAT, and a keylogger. I recognized the Polygon lookup from RST Cloud’s report on HardHatRAT and Ottercookie. RST Cloud’s Ottercookie analysis

Indicators of compromise

GitHub accounts and downloads

I found AxonionTrading-Demo.zip attached to GitHub releases under GLXY-a0x and axondev22. I also came across GLXY-RAS while tracing the campaign on GitHub.

ArtifactIndicator
Release ZIP (GLXY-a0x)hxxps://github[.]com/GLXY-a0x/axonion-trading-demo/releases/download/v1.0.1-alpha/AxonionTrading-Demo.zip
Release ZIP (axondev22)hxxps://github[.]com/axondev22/AxonionTrading-Demo/releases/download/v1.0.1-alpha/AxonionTrading-Demo.zip
Protonmail Address (axondev22)daniel.e.s22@proton.me>
macOS and Linux downloaderhxxps://vercelscript[.]vercel[.]app/u/2fb2db57
Windows downloaderhxxps://vercelscript[.]vercel[.]app/w/2fb2db57

Network

TypeIndicatorNote
IP13[.]140[.]43[.]237C2
IP13[.]140[.]228[.]125C2
IP13[.]140[.]43[.]228C2
IP38[.]92[.]47[.]167C2
IP66[.]235[.]168[.]14C2
IP150[.]241[.]203[.]68C2
IP80[.]190[.]73[.]17C2
IP80[.]190[.]79[.]39NetSupport RAT C2
IP13[.]140[.]233[.]50NetSupport RAT C2
Domainupdpkg[.]netReported first-stage download host
Domainkkhf7a[.]s[.]gyFallback C2 in the loader
Domaindexcore-design[.]vercel[.]appHosted the downloader scripts
Domainvercelscript[.]vercel[.]appHosted the downloader scripts
Domainsummer-bitter-slug[.]matic[.]quiknode[.]proPolygon RPC endpoint seen in the loader. The URL path contained an access token.
Contract0x1a9700E5D74f64429594dF53EFCb6bc8c3936CB5Polygon smart contract used to resolve C2 address
HTTP path/session/b5b0cb4cae71351bRequest path for the next stage

File hashes (SHA-256)

HashLabel
20eec270ef2943875af0f71795d07a7f8c8172d08fced86740ed88535407c3b7macOS and Linux downloader script
e13ae6836d7b5dbc378b0c7b327c5b7c91b99bfce80c3af633f02fe6ea861494w.sh
d3a1c3701616166cf72e6e7293c8fb1da0119593d19ee35f873048ca5891d9dbd.js
dccddc64d50e2594bed7f89f31114beee599e816570f3bfc9e96abf06b38fa3ed.js
ada39027d2db8512d4ff2624e827b1ab6ffe3e7e281b1c1325aed85a89364e1fmain.js
cc6c4a9e261ed854d7aec9e9f618b5dcc46a1ad6ee200e3ef08cfe97da32cb7eStealer binary (Ottercookie)
b425a48b1adf6dc764e3196762f65c6b810049897d047cec6e75986b8d019d75Stealer binary (Ottercookie)
1c5b565e482ca8a647bf587cd94849a45261887fe96ac6f37b3f4a9ea8625068Stealer DLL (Ottercookie)
0757fd49eaa09dffcc2ab8fe482414ef2ec5f8fa2e77940a13cfd774532ddce4Stealer DLL (Ottercookie)
5f409b2c01e8d3aabcf785b4f79f1f5b307272a080e60861433263e01edaef03NetSupport RAT
b11380f81b0a704e8c7e84e8a37885f5879d12fbece311813a41992b3e9787f2NetSupport RAT
c230870ce0e1f6d278e0e86d93e9da0a0e460e651f03da39bbabea8885781d90Keylogger downloader (JS)
1e0cfdb71df64e16052af7159f996d794736540c2ba3e9864777bbbd16879b18Keylogger

Host artifacts

TypeIndicatorNote
File path~/.vs_cache/main.jsPrimary loader
File path~/.cache/rt/w.shStage-1 script
File path/Users/*/.cache/rt/d.jsStage-2 Node loader
File path~/.cache/rt/n/bin/nodeBundled Node runtime
File path/Users/*/.cache/rt/n.tgzBundled Node archive

What I’d look for

I’d start with downloaded archives containing .git/info/attributes and a custom clean filter in .git/config. Inspect those as files. On endpoints, look for Git or an IDE spawning a shell, then check for Node.js running from ~/.cache/rt/ and file activity under both ~/.cache/rt/ and ~/.vs_cache/. The two loader paths I’d search for are ~/.vs_cache/main.js and ~/.cache/rt/d.js. A match on a shared Polygon RPC hostname is more useful when it lines up with those host artifacts.

The opinions expressed here are my own and not those of my employer.

This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.